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Reproducibility—the extent to which consistent results are 
observed when scientific studies are repeated—is one of sci-
ence’s defining features (Bacon, 1267/1859; Jasny, Chin, 
Chong, & Vignieri, 2011; Kuhn, 1962; Popper, 1934/1992; 
Rosenthal, 1991),2 and has even been described as the “demar-
cation criterion between science and nonscience” (Braude, 
1979, p. 2). In principle, the entire body of scientific evidence 
could be reproduced independently by researchers following 
the original methods and drawing from insights gleaned by 
prior investigators. In this sense, belief in scientific evidence is 
not contingent on trust in its originators. Other types of belief 
depend on the authority and motivations of the source; beliefs 
in science do not.3
Considering its central importance, one might expect repli-
cation to be a prominent part of scientific practice. It is not 
(Collins, 1985; Reid, Soley, & Wimmer, 1981; Schmidt, 
2009). An important reason for this is that scientists have 
strong incentives to introduce new ideas but weak incentives 
to confirm the validity of old ideas (Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 
2012). Innovative findings produce rewards of publication, 
employment, and tenure; replicated findings produce a shrug.
Devoting resources to confirmation instead of innovation is 
a poor investment if the original findings are valid. But the 
costs of accepting false findings are high as well. Burgeoning 
research areas could fruitlessly expend resources in the pursuit 
of false leads, and theories could rely on invalid empirical evi-
dence. A wise apportionment of resources between innovation 
and confirmation would take into account the reproducibility 
rate to maximize the rate of knowledge accumulation. How 
would resources be allocated if the reproducibility rate were 
90%? What about 30%?
There exists very little evidence to provide reproducibility 
estimates for scientific fields, though some empirically 
informed estimates are disquieting (Ioannidis, 2005). When 
independent researchers tried to replicate dozens of important 
studies on cancer, women’s health, and cardiovascular disease, 
only 25% of their replication studies confirmed the original 
result (Prinz, Schlange, & Asadullah, 2011). In a similar inves-
tigation, Begley and Ellis (2012) reported a meager 11% repli-
cation rate. In psychology, a survey of unpublished replication 
attempts found that about 50% replicated the original results 
(Hartshorne & Schachner, 2012; see also Wager, Lindquist, 
Nichols, Kober, & van Snellenberg, 2009, on reproducibility in 
neuroscience). In this paper, we introduce the Reproducibility 
Project: an effort to systematically estimate the reproducibility 
rate of psychological science as it is practiced currently, and to 
investigate factors that predict reproducibility.
The Reproducibility Project
Obtaining a meaningful estimate of reproducibility requires 
conducting replications of a sizable number of studies. How-
ever, because of existing incentive structures, it is not in an indi-
vidual scientist’s professional interest to conduct numerous 
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replications. The Reproducibility Project addresses these barri-
ers by spreading the workload over a large number of research-
ers. As of August 23, 2012, 72 volunteers from 41 institutions 
had joined the replication effort. Each contributor plays an 
important but circumscribed role, such as by contributing on a 
team conducting one replication study. Researchers volunteer to 
contribute on the basis of their interests, skills, and available 
resources. Information about the project’s coordination, plan-
ning, materials, and execution is available publicly on the Open 
Science Framework’s Web site (http://openscienceframework.
org/). Open practices increase the accountability of the replica-
tion team and, ideally, the quality of the designs and results.
Selecting Studies for Replication
Studies eligible for replication were selected from 2008 issues 
of three prominent journals that differ in topical emphasis and 
publishing format (i.e., short reports vs. long-form articles): 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and 
Psychological Science.4 To minimize selection biases even 
within this restricted sample, replication teams choose from 
among the first 30 articles published in an issue. From the 
selected article, each team selects a key finding from a single 
study for replication (the last study by default, unless it is 
unfeasible to replicate). As eligible articles are claimed, addi-
tional articles from the sampling frame are made available for 
selection. Not all studies can be replicated. For example, some 
used unique samples or specialized equipment that is unavail-
able, and others were dependent on a specific historical event. 
Although feasibility constraints can reduce the generalizabil-
ity of the ultimate results, they are inevitably part and parcel of 
reproducibility itself.
Conducting the Replications
The project’s replication attempts follow a standardized proto-
col aimed at minimizing irrelevant variation in data collection 
and reporting methods, and maximizing the quality of replica-
tion efforts. The project attempts direct replications—“repetition 
of an experimental procedure” in order to “verify a piece of 
knowledge” (Schmidt, 2009, p. 92, 93). Replications must have 
high statistical power (1−β ≥ .80 for the effect size of the origi-
nal study) and use the original materials, if they are available. 
Researchers solicit feedback on their research design from the 
original authors before collecting data, particularly to identify 
factors that may interfere with replication. Identified threats are 
either remedied with revisions or coded as potential predictors 
of reproducibility and written into the replication report.
Evaluation of Replication-Study Results
Successful replication can be defined by “vote-counting,” either 
narrowly (i.e., obtaining the same statistically significant effect 
as original study) or broadly (i.e., obtaining a directionally 
similar, but not necessarily statistically significant, result), or 
quantitatively defined—for example, through meta-analytic 
estimates combining the original and replication study, com-
parisons of effect sizes, or updated estimates of Bayesian priors. 
As yet, there is no single general, standard answer to the ques-
tion “What is replication?” so we employ multiple criteria (Val-
entine et al., 2011).
Failures to replicate might result from several factors. The 
first is a simple Type II error with an occurrence rate of 1−β: 
Some true findings will fail to replicate purely by chance. 
However, the overall replication rate can be measured against 
the average statistical power across studies. For this reason, 
the project focuses on the overall reproducibility rate. Indi-
vidual studies that fail to replicate are not treated as discon-
firmed. Failures to replicate can also occur if (a) the original 
effect is false; (b) the actual size of the effect is lower than 
originally reported, making it more difficult to detect; (c) the 
design, implementation, or analysis of either the original or 
replication study is flawed; or (d) the replication methodology 
differs from the original methodology in ways that are critical 
for successful replication.5 All of these reasons are important 
to consider in evaluations of reproducibility, but the most 
interesting may be the last. Identifying specific ways in which 
replications and original studies differ, especially when repli-
cations fail, can advance the theoretical understanding of pre-
viously unconsidered conditions necessary to obtain an effect. 
Thus, replication is theoretically consequential.
The most important point is that a failure to replicate an 
effect does not conclusively indicate that the original effect 
was false. An effect may also fail to replicate because of insuf-
ficient power, problems with the design of the replication 
study, or limiting conditions, whether known or unknown. For 
this reason, the Reproducibility Project investigates factors 
such as replication power, the evaluation of the replication-
study design by the original authors, and the original study’s 
sample and effect sizes as predictors of reproducibility. Identi-
fying the contribution of these factors to reproducibility is use-
ful because each has distinct implications for interventions to 
improve reproducibility.
Implications of the Reproducibility Project
An estimate of the reproducibility of current psychological sci-
ence will be an important first. A high reproducibility estimate 
might boost confidence in conventional research and peer-
review practices in the face of criticisms about inappropriate 
flexibility in design, analysis, and reporting that can inflate the 
rate of false positives (Greenwald, 1975; John, Loewenstein, & 
Prelec, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). A low 
estimate might prompt reflection on the quality of standard 
practice, motivate further investigation of reproducibility, and 
ultimately lead to changes in practice and publishing standards 
(Bertamini & Munafò, 2012; LeBel & Peters, 2011).
Some may worry that the discovery of a low reproducibility 
rate will damage the image of psychology or of science more 
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generally. It is certainly possible that opponents of science will 
use such a result to renew their calls to reduce funding for 
basic research. However, we believe that the alternative is 
much worse: having a low reproducibility rate, but failing to 
investigate and discover it. If reproducibility is lower than 
acceptable, then it is vitally important that we know about it in 
order to address it. Self-critique, and the promise of self-cor-
rection, is what makes science such an important part of 
humanity’s effort to understand nature and ourselves.
Conclusion
The Reproducibility Project uses an open methodology to test 
the reproducibility of psychological science. It also models 
procedures designed to simplify and improve reproducibility. 
Readers can review the discussion history of the project, 
examine the project’s design and structured protocol, retrieve 
replication materials from the various teams, obtain reports or 
raw data from completed replications, and join the project to 
conduct a replication (start here: http://openscienceframework 
.org/project/EZcUj/). Increasing the community of volunteers 
will strengthen the power and impact of the project. With this 
open, large-scale, collaborative scientific effort, we hope to 
identify the factors that contribute to the reproducibility and 
validity of psychological science. Ultimately, such evidence—
and steps toward resolution, if the evidence produces a call for 
action—can improve psychological science’s most important 
asset: confidence in its methodology and findings.
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1. Anita Alexander, University of Virginia; Michael Barnett-Cowan, 
The Brain and Mind Institute, University of Western Ontario; 
Elizabeth Bartmess, University of California, San Francisco; Frank 
A. Bosco, Marshall University; Mark Brandt, Tilburg University; 
Joshua Carp, University of Michigan; Jesse J. Chandler, Princeton 
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California, San Francisco; Giulio Costantini, University of Milano-
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University of British Columbia; Casey Eggleston, University of 
Virginia; Vivien Estel, University of Erfurt; Frank J. Farach, 
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Technology; Susann Fiedler, Max Planck Institute for Research on 
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University; Rebecca S. Frazier, University of Virginia; Heather M. 
Fuchs, University of Cologne; Jeff Galak, Carnegie Mellon 
University; Elisa Maria Galliani, University of Padova; Sara García, 
Universidad Nacional de Asunción; Elise M. Giammanco, University 
of Virginia; Elizabeth A. Gilbert, University of Virginia; Roger 
Giner-Sorolla, University of Kent; Lars Goellner, University of 
Erfurt; Jin X. Goh, Northeastern University; R. Justin Goss, 
University of Texas at San Antonio; Jesse Graham, University of 
Southern California; James A. Grange, Keele University; Jeremy R. 
Gray, Michigan State University; Sarah Gripshover, Stanford 
University; Joshua Hartshorne, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology; Timothy B. Hayes, University of Southern California; 
Georg Jahn, University of Greifswald; Kate Johnson, University of 
Southern California; William Johnston, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology; Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba, Virginia Commonwealth 
University; Calvin K. Lai, University of Virginia; Daniel Lakens, 
Eindhoven University of Technology; Kristin Lane, Bard College; 
Etienne P. LeBel, University of Western Ontario; Minha Lee, 
University of Virginia; Kristi Lemm, Western Washington University; 
Sean Mackinnon, Dalhousie University; Michael May, University of 
Bonn; Katherine Moore, Elmhurst College; Matt Motyl, University 
of Virginia; Stephanie M. Müller, University of Erfurt; Marcus 
Munafo, University of Bristol; Brian A. Nosek, University of 
Virginia; Catherine Olsson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; 
Dave Paunesku, Stanford University; Marco Perugini, University of 
Milano-Bicocca; Michael Pitts, Reed College; Kate Ratliff, 
University of Florida; Frank Renkewitz, University of Erfurt; 
Abraham M. Rutchick, California State University, Northridge; 
Gillian Sandstrom, University of British Columbia; Rebecca Saxe, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dylan Selterman, University 
of Maryland; William Simpson, University of Virginia; Colin Tucker 
Smith, University of Florida; Jeffrey R. Spies, University of Virginia; 
Nina Strohminger, Duke University; Thomas Talhelm, University of 
Virginia; Anna van ’t Veer, Tilburg University; Michelangelo 
Vianello, University of Padova.
2. Some distinguish between “reproducibility” and “replicability” 
by treating the former as a narrower case of the latter (e.g., computa-
tional sciences) or vice versa (e.g., biological sciences). We ignore 
the distinction.
3. That is, they are not supposed to matter. To the extent that they do 
is evidence of current scientific practices relying on authority rather 
than evidence.
4. Additional journals may be added in the future if enough volun-
teers join the project.
5. Note that the Reproducibility Project does not evaluate whether 
the original interpretation of the finding is correct. For example, if an 
eligible study had an apparent confound in its design, that confound 
would be retained in the replication attempt. Confirmation of theo-
retical interpretations is an independent consideration.
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